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Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime



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“Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas... while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools.”

Introduction

¹ This paper briefly reviews the research on the crime control effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs. Readers interested in a more detailed assessment of the crime prevention value of pulling levers focused deterrence programs should acquire the full report (Braga and Weisburd 2012) available on the Campbell Crime and Justice Group web page (www.campbellcollaboration.org).

Introduction

Deterrence theory posits that crimes can be prevented when the offender perceives that the costs of committing the crime outweigh the benefits (Gibbs 1975; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Most discussions of the deterrence mechanism distinguish between general and special deterrence (Cook 1980). General deterrence is the idea that the general population is dissuaded from committing crime when it sees that punishment necessarily follows the commission of a crime. Special deterrence involves punishment administered to criminals with the intent to discourage them from committing crimes in the future. Much of the literature evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those crimes (Apel and Nagin 2011; Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978).

In recent years, scholars have begun to argue that police interventions provide an effective approach for gaining both special and general deterrence against crime. A series of rigorous program evaluations have shown that the police can be effective in preventing crime (Braga 2001; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004) and that such crime prevention benefits are not offset by displacement of crime to areas near police interventions (Braga 2001; Weisburd et al. 2006). Durlauf and Nagin (2011) have drawn from this literature to argue that “[i]ncreasing the visibility of the police by hiring more officers and by allocating existing officers in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension consistently seem to have substantial marginal deterrent effects” (14). Indeed, they conclude that crime prevention in the United States would be improved by “shifting resources from imprisonment to policing” (ibid, 9–10).

A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing evidence of the effectiveness of police deterrence strategies is the focused deterrence framework, often referred to as pulling levers policing¹ (Kennedy 1997, 2008). Pioneered in Boston as a problem-oriented policing project to halt serious gang violence during the 1990s (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996), the focused deterrence framework has been applied in many U.S. cities through federally sponsored violence prevention programs, such as the Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dalton 2002).

Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by offenders, while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools to do so, such as communicating incentives and disincentives directly to targeted offenders (Kennedy 1997, 2008). The focused deterrence approach is also consistent with recent theorizing about police innovation, which suggests that approaches that seek both to create more focus in the application of crime prevention programs and to expand the tools of policing are likely to be the most successful (Weisburd and Eck 2004).



Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problem-oriented exercises.

Identifying Evaluations
of Pulling Levers Focused
Deterrence Programs

Identifying Evaluations of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

We examined the effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs by reviewing all available academic studies evaluating pulling levers strategies. To be eligible for this review, programs had to fit within the basic pulling levers focused deterrence framework described by Kennedy, which included (2006, 156–157):

- Selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or street drug dealing
- Pulling together an interagency enforcement group, typically including police, probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal enforcement agencies
- Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-line police officers, to identify key offenders—and groups of offenders, such as street gangs and drug crews—and the context of their behavior
- Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and groups and designed to substantially influence that context, for example, by using any and all legal tools (or levers) to sanction groups whose members commit serious violence
- Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral voices of affected communities to those same offenders and groups
- Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know that they are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shootings) will get special attention, when that has happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they can do to avoid enforcement action: e.g., offenders are invited or directed (if they are on probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings (i.e., forums, notifications or call-ins) with law enforcement officials, service providers, and community figures

We used this basic framework to assist in determining whether particular programs engaged the focused deterrence approach. However, certain programs that were determined to be eligible for this review did not necessarily follow the specific pulling levers steps identified by Kennedy (2006). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problem-oriented exercises where specific recurring crime problems are analyzed and responses are highly customized to local conditions and operational capacities. As such, we fully anticipated a variety of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies to be identified by our systematic review. Identified studies were further screened to ensure that rigorous evaluation designs, such as randomized experiments and quasi-experiments, were used.²

We paid particular attention to studies that measured crime displacement effects and diffusion of crime control benefit effects. For instance, Kennedy (2009) described a place-based application of pulling levers focused on a disorderly drug market operating in High Point, North Carolina. Crime prevention strategies focused on specific locations have been criticized as resulting in displacement (see Reppetto 1976). More recently, academics have observed that crime prevention programs sometimes result in the complete opposite of displacement—that crime control benefits can be greater than expected and “spill over” into places beyond the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd 1994).

Our review was not restricted to a specific time period. Eligible studies included published as well as unpublished works: e.g., journal articles, theses/dissertations, reports, books, book chapters, and conference papers. (For further details of the systematic search methodology, see Braga and Weisburd 2012.)

²These evaluation designs permit the clearest assessments of “cause and effect” in determining whether hot spots policing programs prevent crime. These designs examine pre- and post-program measurements of crime outcomes in targeted locations relative to “control” locations. The control groups in the identified hot spots evaluations received routine levels of traditional police enforcement tactics.

We reviewed a total of 2,473 article summaries for any suggestion of an evaluation of a pulling levers focused deterrence program. Of the 2,473 summaries, we selected 93 for closer review. We acquired and carefully assessed the full-text reports, journal articles, and books for these evaluations to determine whether pulling levers interventions were involved and whether the studies used rigorous evaluation designs. Using these methods, 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations were identified and included in this review:

1. Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2001)
2. Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, California (Tita et al. 2003)
3. Indianapolis (Indiana) Violence Reduction Partnership (McGarrell et al. 2006)
4. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007)
5. Operation Peacekeeper in Stockton, California (Braga 2008)
6. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008)
7. Drug Market Intervention in Nashville, Tennessee (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009)
8. Drug Market Intervention in Rockford, Illinois (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010)
9. Cincinnati (Ohio) Initiative to Reduce Violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010)
10. Operation CeaseFire in Newark, New Jersey (Boyle et al. 2010)

“The deterrence message was...a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement.”

Characteristics of
Pulling Levers Focused
Deterrence Programs

Characteristics of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

The 10 selected studies (see page 10) examined pulling levers focused deterrence interventions that were implemented in small, medium, and large U.S. cities (see Appendix A on page 30). Six studies (Boston, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Lowell, and Stockton) evaluated the crime reduction effects of pulling levers strategies on serious violence generated by street gangs or criminally active street groups. Two studies (Nashville and Rockford) evaluated strategies focused on reducing crime driven by street-level drug markets; these types of programs are generally called “Drug Market Intervention” (DMI) pulling levers focused deterrence strategies. Two studies (Newark and Chicago) evaluated crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals.

The pulling levers focused deterrence strategies designed to reduce violence by gangs and criminally active street groups generally replicate the Operation Ceasefire process developed in Boston during the 1990s (Braga et al. 2001). Briefly, the Boston Operation Ceasefire program was designed to prevent violence by reaching out directly to gangs, explicitly saying that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997). The chronic involvement of gang members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, vulnerable to a coordinated criminal justice response. As such, the authorities could:

- Disrupt street drug activity
- Focus police attention on low-level street crimes, such as trespassing and public drinking
- Serve outstanding warrants
- Cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities
- Deliver strict probation and parole enforcement
- Seize drug proceeds and other assets
- Ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention
- Request (and enforce) stronger bail terms
- Bring potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity

Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help.

The Boston Ceasefire working group, consisting of criminal justice, social service, and community-based partners, also delivered an explicit message that violence was unacceptable to the community and that “street” justifications for violence were mistaken. The Boston Ceasefire working group delivered this message in formal meetings (i.e., forums or call-ins) with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, in meetings with inmates at secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, then the normal workings of the police, the prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Boston Ceasefire working group concentrated its enforcement actions on those gangs.

DMI strategies seek to shut down overt drug markets entirely (Kennedy 2009). Enforcement powers are used strategically and sparingly, employing arrest and prosecution only against violent offenders and when nonviolent offenders have resisted all efforts to desist and receive help. Through the use of “banked” cases,³ the strategy makes the promise of law enforcement sanctions against dealers direct and credible, so that dealers have no doubt concerning the consequences of offending and have good reason to change their behavior.

The strategy also brings powerful informal social control to bear on dealers from immediate family and community figures. It organizes and focuses services, help, and support on dealers so that those who are willing have what they need to change their lives. Each operation also includes a maintenance strategy.

The two crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals deviated from the classic pulling levers focused deterrence approach developed in Boston and defined by Kennedy (2006). However, after a careful review of program elements, we determined that the necessary components of an eligible study were present.

³ A “banked” case refers to a potential prosecution for narcotics sales. The prosecution is supported by audio and video evidence usually obtained through a controlled buy that is held at an inactive status unless the subject of the prosecution continues dealing, at which point an arrest warrant is issued and prosecution proceeds.

Boyle et al. (2010) described Newark's Operation CeaseFire strategy as focused on preventing gun violence by criminally active individuals; this hybrid of the Boston Ceasefire pulling levers model (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996) and the Chicago CeaseFire public health approach uses trained street outreach staff, public education campaigns, and community mobilization to prevent shootings (Skogan et al. 2008).

The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) study evaluated the violence reduction effects of a strategy comprised of four key interventions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007):

1. Increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns
2. Lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions
3. Supply-side firearm policing activities
4. Social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification meetings

“...these programs generated significant crime control benefits.”

Effects of Pulling Levers
Focused Deterrence
Programs on Crime

⁴ During our search for eligible studies, several scholars suggested that the systematic review include the Hawaii Opportunity with Probation Enforcement (HOPE) randomized controlled trial (Hawken and Kleiman 2009). HOPE was a community supervision program aimed at substance-abusing probationers. The program relied on a mandate to abstain from illicit drugs, backed by swift and certain sanctions for drug test failures, and preceded by a clear and direct warning. While this program represented a departure from our selection criteria, we agree that the deterrence mechanisms in HOPE are similar to those engaged by the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations included in this report. Similar to the findings of the other programs, HOPE generated impressive crime control benefits. Only 21 percent of HOPE probationers experienced new arrests as compared to 47 percent of control probationers.

⁵ Meta-analysis is a technique used to investigate overall program effects associated with a selected set of studies (see Lipsey and Wilson 2001).

⁶ Although the reason why the Newark program failed to generate larger impacts on gun violence is unclear, growing evaluation evidence suggests the CeaseFire Chicago community-driven violence reduction approach—with its premium on gang violence mediation and negotiation work by “violence interrupters”—may not produce the desired violence prevention benefits (see Papachristos 2011).

Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs on Crime

Nine of the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations concluded that these programs generated significant crime control benefits (see Appendix B on page 31).⁴ A meta-analysis of these pulling levers strategies also found that these programs generated an overall statistically significant reduction in crime outcome measures (see Braga and Weisburd 2012).⁵ Although Boyle et al. (2010) reported a small but positive reduction in gunshot wound incidents from Newark’s Operation CeaseFire, this evaluation was the only one to not report any discernible crime prevention benefits generated by the violence reduction strategy.⁶

Evaluations of pulling levers strategies targeting gangs and criminally active groups reported large, statistically significant reductions in violent crime. These results included a 63 percent reduction in youth homicides in Boston (Braga et al. 2001), a 44 percent reduction in gun assault incidents in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008), a 42 percent reduction in gun homicides in Stockton, California (Braga 2008), a 35 percent reduction in homicides of criminally active group members in Cincinnati (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010), a 34 percent reduction in total homicides in Indianapolis (McGarrell et al. 2006), and noteworthy short-term reductions in violent crime in Los Angeles (Tita et al. 2003).

The two DMI evaluations also reported statistically significant crime reductions. The DMI generated a 55 percent reduction in illegal drug possession incidents in Nashville (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009) and a 22 percent reduction in non-violent offenses in Rockford (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010). While Newark’s strategy did not generate statistically significant crime control gains when high-rate offenders were targeted, the Chicago PSN intervention—the other program focused on individuals—was associated with a 37 percent reduction in homicide (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

Two of the three studies that measured possible crime displacement and diffusion effects reported noteworthy diffusion of crime control benefits associated with the focused deterrence intervention. Consistent with the absence of a treatment effect, the Newark evaluation did not report any statistically significant crime displacement or diffusion effects (Boyle et al. 2010). The Nashville evaluation reported statistically significant reductions in drug offenses and total calls for service in the non-treated area immediately adjoining the targeted drug market area (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009). The Los Angeles evaluation found statistically significant reductions in violent crime in areas surrounding the targeted census block groups as well as noteworthy reductions in violent offending by non-treated gangs that were “socially tied” to treatment gangs (Tita et al. 2003).

“...jurisdictions...should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control interventions.”

Conclusion and
Policy Implications

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The available scientific evidence on the crime reduction value of focused deterrence strategies has been characterized as “promising” but “descriptive rather than evaluative” (Skogan and Frydl 2004: 241) and as “limited” but “still evolving” (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005: 10) by the U.S. National Research Council’s Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices and its Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms, respectively.

However, our systematic review identified 10 evaluations of focused deterrence strategies; nine of these evaluations were completed after the National Research Council reports were published. A better-developed base of scientific evidence now exists to assess whether crime prevention impacts are associated with this approach.

The basic findings of our review are very positive. Nine out of 10 eligible studies reported strong and statistically significant crime reductions associated with the approach. The findings of eligible focused deterrence evaluations fit well within existing research suggesting that deterrence-based strategies, if applied correctly, can reduce crime (Apel and Nagin 2011).

The focused deterrence approach seems to have the desirable characteristic of altering offenders’ perceptions of sanction risk. Our findings are also supported by the growing body of scientific evidence that suggests police departments, and their partners, can be effective in controlling specific crime problems when they engage in a variety of partnerships and tailor an array of tactics to address underlying criminogenic conditions and dynamics (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004). Indeed, our study suggests that Durlauf and Nagin (2011) are correct in their conclusion that both imprisonment and crime can be reduced through the noteworthy marginal deterrent effects generated by allocating police officers, and their criminal justice partners, in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension.

While the results of this review support deterrence principles, other complementary crime control mechanisms are at work in the focused deterrence strategies described here that need to be highlighted and better understood. In Durlauf and Nagin’s (2011) article, the focus is on the possibilities for increasing perceived risk and deterrence by increasing police presence.

Although Durlauf and Nagin’s conclusion is warranted by the data and represents an important component of the causal mechanisms that have increased the effectiveness of focused deterrence strategies, we believe it misses an important part of the story.

In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is on not only increasing the risk of offending but also decreasing opportunity structures for violence, deflecting offenders away from crime, increasing the collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the legitimacy of police actions. We suspect that the large effects we observe come precisely from the multi-faceted ways in which this program influences criminals.

A number of scholars have focused on the mechanism of discouragement when discussing the crime prevention benefits of interventions (see Clarke and Weisburd 1994). Discouragement emphasizes reducing the opportunities for crime and increasing alternative opportunity structures for offenders. In this context, situational crime prevention techniques are often implemented as part of the core pulling levers work in focused deterrence strategies (Braga and Kennedy 2012). For instance, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence used civil forfeiture techniques to close down a highly problematic bar that generated recurring serious violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010). Extending guardianship, assisting natural surveillance, strengthening formal surveillance, reducing the anonymity of offenders, and utilizing place managers can greatly enhance the range and quality of the varying enforcement and regulatory levers that can be pulled on offending groups and key actors in criminal networks (see Welsh and Farrington 2009).

The focused deterrence approach also seeks to redirect offenders away from violent crime through the provision of social services and opportunities. In all the gang/group interventions reviewed here, gang members were offered job training, employment assistance, substance abuse treatment, housing assistance, and a variety of other services and opportunities.

Aspects of the “broken windows” theory may also be relevant for understanding how and why focused deterrence programs reduce crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The theory argues that intensive police efforts to reduce social and physical disorder can reverse the breakdown of community social controls that accompany unintended and unrestrained violations of social order. Thus, crime is reduced in part because of police efforts and in part because of community members’ increased vigilance. Kleiman and Smith (1990) describe the potential benefits of an intensive police effort to reduce drug crime and disorder, noting “a dramatic police effort may call forth increased neighborhood efforts at self-protection against drug dealing activity; given police resources, such self-defense may be essential to long-run control of drug dealing” (88).

Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) emphasize the capacity of a community to realize common values and regulate behavior within it through cohesive relationships and mutual trust among residents. The authors argue that the key factor determining whether crime will flourish is the sense of a community's collective efficacy. A community with strong collective efficacy is characterized by high capacities for collective action for the public good. Focused deterrence enhances collective efficacy in communities by emphasizing the importance of engaging and enlisting community members in the strategies developed. The DMI strategy, for example, draws upon collective efficacy principles by engaging family, friends, and other influential community members in addressing the criminal behaviors of local drug dealers (Kennedy 2009).

Finally, the focused deterrence approach takes advantage of recent theorizing regarding procedural justice and legitimacy. Policing's effectiveness is dependent on public perceptions of the legitimacy of police actions (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Tyler 1990, 2004). Legitimacy is the public belief that the community has a responsibility and obligation to voluntarily accept and defer to the decisions made by authorities (Tyler 1990, 2004). Recent studies suggest that when procedural justice approaches are used by the police, citizens will not only evaluate the legitimacy of the police more highly but also be more likely to obey the law in the future (see Paternoster et al. 1997). Advocates of focused deterrence strategies argue that targeted offenders should be treated with respect and dignity (Kennedy 2008, 2011), reflecting procedural justice principles. The Chicago PSN strategy, for example, sought to increase the likelihood that the offenders would "buy in" and voluntarily comply with the pro-social, anti-violence norms being advocated by criminal justice, social service, and community representatives interacting with offenders in ways that enhance procedural justice in their communication sessions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

In closing, focused deterrence strategies are a recent addition to the existing scholarly literature on crime control and prevention strategies. While the evaluation evidence needs to be strengthened and the theoretical underpinnings of the approach need further refinement, jurisdictions suffering from gang violence, overt drug markets, and repeat offender problems should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control interventions. The existing evidence suggests that these new approaches to crime prevention and control generate noteworthy reductions in crime.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

Study	Program Type
<i>Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire</i> Braga et al. (2001)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
<i>Los Angeles (CA) Operation Ceasefire</i> Tita et al. (2003)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
<i>Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership</i> McGarrell et al. (2006)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
<i>Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods</i> Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)	Gun violence reduction strategy comprised of four interventions: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification meetings
<i>Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper</i> Braga (2008)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
<i>Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods</i> Braga et al. (2008)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
<i>Rockford (IL) Drug Market Intervention</i> Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market
<i>Nashville (TN) Drug Market Intervention</i> Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market
<i>Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence</i> Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by criminally active street groups
<i>Newark (NJ) Operation CeaseFire</i> Boyle et al. (2010)	Violence reduction strategy targeting individual gang members, described as a “hybrid” between the Boston CeaseFire pulling levers strategy and the Chicago CeaseFire street-worker program

Appendix B: Results of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Evaluations

Study	Crime Outcomes	Displacement / Diffusion
<i>Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire</i> Braga et al. (2001)	Large reductions in youth homicide incidents, gun assault incidents, and shots-fired calls for service	Not measured
<i>Los Angeles (CA) Operation Ceasefire</i> Tita et al. (2003)	Short-term reductions in violent crime reported while intervention was in place	Diffusion of crime control benefits reported
<i>Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership</i> McGarrell et al. (2006)	Large reduction in total homicide incidents	Not measured
<i>Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods</i> Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)	Large reduction in total homicide incidents; reductions in gun homicide and aggravated assaults	Not measured
<i>Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper</i> Braga (2008)	Large reduction in gun homicide incidents	Not measured
<i>Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods</i> Braga et al. (2008)	Large reduction in gun assault incidents	Not measured
<i>Rockford (IL) Drug Market Intervention</i> Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)	Reduction in non-violent offenses	Not measured

Study	Crime Outcomes	Displacement / Diffusion
<i>Nashville (TN) Drug Market Intervention</i> Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)	Reductions in illegal drug possession offenses, illegal drug equipment offenses, and property crime offenses	Diffusion of crime control benefits reported
<i>Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence</i> Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)	Large reduction in group member-involved homicides	Not measured
<i>Newark (NJ) Operation CeaseFire</i> Boyle et al. (2010)	No noteworthy effects on gunshot wound incidents reported	No displacement or diffusion effects reported



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